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Abstract. The evaluation of social risk equity for alternative probability
distributions over the potential sets of fatalities is analyzed axiomatically.
Fishburn and Straffin [Equity considerations in public risks valuation, Oper-
atons Research 37 (1999), 229–239] have identified a necessary and sufficient
condition for two social risk distributions to be judged to be socially indif-
ferent whenever their associated distributions of risk of death for individuals
and for the number of fatalities are the same. It is argued that this approach
does not permit society to exhibit any concern for the number of people an
individual perishes with. A weakening of the Fishburn–Straffin condition
that is compatible with a concern for shared destinies is proposed.
Keywords and Phrases: social risk evaluation, social risk equity, public
risk, shared destinies
Re´sume´. Nous proposons une analyse axiomatique de l’e´valuation de l’exposition
collective a` un risque de de´ce`s. Il s’agit plus pre´cise´ment de comparer, en ter-
mes d’e´quite´, diffe´rentes distributions de probabilite´ de de´ce`s pour l’ensemble
des sous-groupes de la population. Fishburn and Straffin [Equity considera-
tions in public risks valuation, Operatons Research 37 (1999), 229–239] ont
identifie´ une condition ne´cessaire et suffisante pour que deux risques sociaux
soient juge´s e´galement e´quitables de`s lors qu’ils conduisent d’une part a` des
probabilite´s individuelles de de´ce`s identiques, et d’autre part aux meˆme dis-
tributions de probabilite´ sur le nombre de de´ce`s. Nous montrons qu’une telle
approche ne permet pas de prendre en compte l’importance que peut avoir
le fait de partager son destin avec un plus ou moins grand nombre d’autres
personnes. Nous proposons un affaiblissement de la condition de Fishburn
et Straffin qui permet de tenir compte de l’influence de la communaute´ de
destin dans l’e´valuation d’un risque social.
Mots cle´s: e´valuation du risque social, e´quite´ sociale face au risque, risque
collectif, communaute´ de destin.
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1. Introduction
Societies face risks and design public policies to manage these risks. In many
cases, these risks involve the potential loss of life. Examples of such risks in-
clude hurricanes, earthquakes, epidemics, terrorist attacks, nuclear disasters,
and the collapse of bridges. In order to decide which amomg the feasible risk-
reducing policies to implement, it is necessary to evaluate these risks from
a social point of view. For risks of death, common ways of evaluating the
success of a policy are to compute the expected number of lives saved or the
reduction in the average risk of death. Such measures fail to account for some
important dimensions of risk evaluation, such as the equity of the resulting
distribution of risks or social risk attitudes about the potential number of
fatalities. For example, the construction of a levee that ensures that one
neighbourhood in a city is safe from floods while leaving the rest of the city
unprotected may be regarded as being socially inferior to the construction of
a more extensive system of levees that reduces, but does not eliminate, the
risk of flooding in all parts of the city. Society may also prefer to have a non-
nuclear military defence strategy rather than to acquire nuclear weapons,
even if the expected loss of life is the same in both cases, so as to avoid the
possibility of a catastrophic loss of life with the latter strategy.
Beginning with Keeney (1980a,b,c), an extensive theoretical literature
has developed that is devoted to the analysis of social risk equity. See, for
example, Broome (1982), Fishburn (1984), Fishburn and Sarin (1991), Fish-
burn and Straffin (1989), Harvey (1985), Keeney and Winkler (1985), and
Sarin (1985). Attitudes towards social risk equity have also been investigated
using surveys and interviews by Keller and Sarin (1988) and Bian and Keller
(1999).
One issue that has been considered in this literature concerns the extent
to which a satisfactory index of overall social risk equity can be obtained by
aggregating indices that measure different dimensions of social risk.1 Sup-
pose that we are concerned with the risk of death. Each subgroup of the
population is a potential fatality set; i.e., each subgroup could be the set of
individuals who perish as a result of their exposure to the risk being con-
sidered. A social risk distribution is a probability distribution over these
fatality sets. Given such a probability distribution, one can compute each
1For a thoughtful recent discussion of some of the other issues that arise when evaluating
social risks, see Fleurbaey (2006).
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individual’s probabilty of death and the probability that there will be any
particular number of fatalities. Using this information, Keeney and Winkler
(1985), Sarin (1985), and Fishburn and Sarin (1991) have constructed indices
of social risk equity for the distributions of individual likelihoods of death
and indices of social risk equity for the distributions on the number of fatal-
ities which are then aggregated into an overall index of social risk equity.2
This two-stage procedure would be justified if two social risk distributions
are judged to be socially indifferent whenever their associated distributions
of risk for individuals and for the number of fatalities are the same. Assum-
ing that the overall index is continuous, Fishburn and Straffin (1989) have
identified a necessary and sufficient condition for this to be the case.
In this article, we argue that this approach fails to take account of an
important dimension of social risk equity. Individuals care about the number
of people who share their destiny. It is quite a different matter to die alone
than to perish with a number of other individuals. As we shall show, it is
possible for the distributions over how many other people one dies with to
differ between two social risk distributions even though they share the same
distributions of risk of death for individuals and the same distributions of
risk for the number of fatalities. It is not possible for society to exhibit any
concern for this “shared destinies” aspect of social risk equity if one adopts
Fishburn and Straffin’s condition. We propose a weakening of their condition
that permits such a concern and show that our condition implies that the
social risk evaluation only depends on the probabilities that an individual
dies with k other individuals for all possible values of k.
In Section 2, we present our formal model of social risk equity evaluation.
We consider some examples that illustrate the importance of the three di-
mensions of social risk equity that we have identified in Section 3. In Section
4, after first discussing the Fishburn–Straffin condition, we show how this
condition can be weakened so as to be compatible with a social concern for
shared destinies and we identify the restrictions on the social risk evaluation
implied by our axioms. We offer some concluding remarks in Section 5.
2The measures of risks for individuals and for fatalities are sometimes referred to as
being utility functions for ex ante and ex post risk equity, respectively. Both Keeney and
Winkler (1985) and Sarin (1985) regard the measure of social risk equity for individuals
as being an index of ex ante social risk equity and the measure of social risk equity for
fatalities as being the sum of an index of ex post social risk equity and an index that
captures the direct concern for the number of fatalities.
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2. A formal model of social risk equity evaluation
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a society consisting of n ≥ 2 individuals, where n ≥ 2.
This society faces a social risk. The relevant outcomes for risk evaluation are
the potential subsets S ⊆ N of individuals who might die as a consequence of
their exposure to this risk. Thus, there are 2n mutually exclusive outcomes,
from ∅ (nobody dies) to N (everybody dies). Each set S is a fatality set.
There is uncertainty as to which of these outcomes will be realized, which is
captured by a probability distribution p on 2N . We refer to p as a social risk
distribution. Let P denote the set of all such probability distributions.
Following most of the literature on the evaluation of social risk equity,
we restrict attention to homogeneous societies. A society is homogeneous if
any differences between individuals other than their differing exposures to
social risks are irrelevant for the social risk assessment. As Fishburn and
Straffin (1989) and Fishburn and Sarin (1991) have noted, this assumption is
not appropriate if individuals can be partitioned into homogeneous subgroups
that differ from one another in a socially relevant characteristic. For example,
individuals may be grouped into families or neighbourhoods, with society
exhibiting a social preference for dispersing the risks across a number of these
groups rather than concentrating them in a small number of them. Fishburn
and Sarin (1991) have developed measures of social risk that incorporate a
concern for this kind of dispersive equity.
Let N∗ = N ∪ {0}. N∗ is the number of individuals who might die as
a result of the social risk. For all k ∈ N∗, let T (k) = {S ∈ 2N ||S| = k}
be the subsets of the population in which exactly k individuals die. For all
(k, i) ∈ N ×N , S(k, i) = {S ∈ T (k)|i ∈ S}. S(k, i) is the set of population
subgroups in which person i dies with k− 1 other individuals. For the social
risk distribution p, the probability that the outcome is a member of S(k, i)
is
∑
S∈S(k,i) p(S).
Let A denote the set of probability distributions over N and B denote
the set of probability distributions over N∗. For all p ∈ P , let αp be the
probability distribution in A whose ith component is αp(i) = ∑S3i p(S).
That is, αp(i) is the ex ante probability that person i will die and αp is the
risk profile for individuals. Similarly, for all p ∈ P , let βp be the probability
distribution in B whose kth component is βp(k) = ∑S∈T (k) p(S). That is,
βp(k) is the ex ante probability that there will be exactly k fatalities and βp
is the risk profile for fatalities.
A government (or other body) can undertake policies that affect the social
3
risk distribution. In order to determine what policy to implement, it needs
to know how to rank different social risk distributions in P in terms of their
social acceptability. This ranking is described by a binary relation  on P
which is interpreted as meaning “weakly socially preferred to.” Let ∼ and 
denote the symmetric and asymmetric factors of , respectively. Henceforth,
we refer to  as the social risk equity evaluation. Note that the restriction of
 to social risk distributions in which there is positive probability for only one
fatality set is a social preference on the set of possible ex post consequences.
There are two basic properties that we require  to satisfy. Our first
restriction on  is that it is an ordering of P .
Axiom 1.  is a reflexive, complete, and transitive binary relation on P .
We also require  to be continuous.
Axiom 2. The sets {q ∈ P|p  q} and {q ∈ P|q  p} are open for all p ∈ P .
3. Some examples
As we have discussed, one approach to constructing the social risk equity
evaluation  (or a social utility function representing this relation) is to sep-
arately construct measures of social equity for the risk profiles for individuals
and for the risk profiles for the number of fatalities, and then to aggregate
these measures into an overall assessment of social risk equity. With this ap-
proach, all of the relevant information about a probability distribution p ∈ P
is contained in the corresponding distributions αp and βp. In effect, this ap-
proach regards social risk equity as being composed of two dimensions, with
overall social risk equity being decomposable into these two components.
Such a decomposition neglects information about the distribution p that
may be essential for evaluating social risks, such as information abut shared
destinies. It is therefore important not to assume a priori that a measure of
social risk equity is decomposable. In other words, a more holistic approach
is warranted, and this is provided by the social risk equity evaluation .
Nevertheless, how society takes account of the risks that individuals face and
of the possible number of fatalities plays an important role in forming an
overall evaluation of social risk, even if these two dimensions of social risk do
not capture all that is of social concern. The following examples illustrate
the importance of these considerations.
Example 1. The set of individuals who live in some country isN = {1, . . . , 100}.
Everybody lives in either city A or city B, both of which have the same num-
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ber of residents. For concreteness, suppose that NA = {1, . . . , 50} live in city
A and NB = {51, . . . , 100} live in city B. There is a probability x that a
hurricane will strike this country, but there is uncertainty as to its path. The
hurricane will destroy city A with probability x
2
and with the same probabil-
ity it will destroy city B. In each case, all of the inhabitants of the affected
city will die and all of the residents of the other city are spared.
Given its limited budget for emergency responses and the time available
for hurricane preparation, the government has a choice between three options:
Option 1. Devote all of the emergency aid budget to the protection of city
A and the evacuation of its residents, which reduces the risks faced by
residents of city A to 0, but does not change the risks faced by residents
of city B.
Option 2. Devote all of the emergency aid budget to the protection of city
B and the evacuation of its residents, which reduces the risks faced by
residents of city B to 0, but does not change the risks faced by residents
of city A.
Option 3. Share equally the emergency aid budget between cities A and B,
which reduces the risk for each resident of the country to x
4
.
Let pj be the social risk distribution corresponding to option j, j = 1, 2, 3.
These three distributions are summarized in the following table. Of course,
pj(S) = 0 for all subgroups S not shown.
∅ NA NB
p1 1− x
2
0 x
2
p2 1− x
2
x
2
0
p3 1− x
2
x
4
x
4
It can easily be checked that the risk profiles for the number of fatalities
associated with these three options are as given in the following table.
0 1 · · · 49 50 51 · · · 100
βp1 1− x2 0 · · · 0 x2 0 · · · 0
βp2 1− x2 0 · · · 0 x2 0 · · · 0
βp3 1− x2 0 · · · 0 x2 0 · · · 0
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Thus, all three options result in the same probability distribution over the
number of fatalities: with probability 1− x
2
, nobody will die, and with proba-
bility x
2
, half the population will die. As a consequence, the expected number
of deaths is the same whatever option is chosen.
The risk profiles for individuals associated with these three options are
presented in the following table.
1 2 · · · 50 51 52 · · · 100
αp1 0 0 · · · 0 x2 x2 · · · x2
αp2
x
2
x
2
· · · x
2
0 0 · · · 0
αp3
x
4
x
4
· · · x
4
x
4
x
4
· · · x
4
If options 1 or 2 are chosen, half the population has an individual proba-
bility of dying equal to x
2
, whereas the other half has an individual probability
of dying equal to 0. However, if option 3 is adopted, then each individual
has the same probability of dying, namely, x
4
.
In this example, the three options affect how the risk of dying is dis-
tributed between individuals, but they do not differ in the probabilty that
any given number of individuals will die. In effect, the government must sim-
ply decide how best to distribute the probability x
2
that half of its residents
will die among all of its residents given the constraint that individuals who
live in the same city must share the same destiny. On equity grounds, option
3 is socially preferred to options 1 and 2 because the individual probabili-
ties of death are more equally distributed if option 3 is chosen. Because the
society is homogeneous, it is reasonable to regard options 2 and 3 as being
socially indifferent.
In general, the distribution of individual probabilities of dying is clearly
not sufficient to evaluate social risk equity because it does not take into
account the fairness of the resulting probabilty distribution over the number
of fatalities. The following example illustrates a situation in which such
considerations are decisive.
Example 2. The set of passengers on a boat is N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. The boat is
sinking, but there is only one lifeboat and it is designed for only two people.
The skipper (whose code of honour requires him to go down with his boat)
has the choice between the two following options:
Option 1. Let exactly half of the passengers board the lifeboat. These
passengers will survive for sure, whereas the passengers who remain on
6
the sinking boat will die for sure. In order to choose who boards the
lifeboat, the skipper designs a fair lottery. Thus, each passenger has a
probability 1
2
of obtaining a place on the lifeboat.
Option 2. Let all of the passengers board the lifeboat. The overcrowded
lifeboat will sink with probability 1
2
, leading to the death of all of the
passengers. If the lifeboat does not sink, all of the passengers will
survive.
Let qj be the social risk distribution corresponding to option j, j = 1, 2.
These distributions are summarized in the following table, where qj(S) = 0
for any subgoup S not shown.
∅ {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4} {2, 3} {2, 4} {3, 4} {1, 2, 3, 4}
q1 0 1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
0
q2 1
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
2
As illustrated in the following table, every individual has a probability of
death equal to 1
2
regardless of the option chosen.
1 2 3 4
αq1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
αq2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
The probability distributions over the number of fatalities are presented
in the following table.
0 1 2 3 4
βq1 0 0 1 0 0
βq2
1
2
0 0 0 1
2
Although the expected number of deaths is the same whatever option is
chosen (namely, half the number of passengers), the two options lead to very
different distributions over the number of deaths. If option 1 is chosen, half
the passengers will die for sure, whereas if option 2 is chosen, with probability
1
2
all of the passengers will survive and with the same probability the lifeboat
will sink and they all die.
In this example, it is reasonable to suppose that attitudes about the actual
number of fatalities should be decisive. If one believes that society should
have a preference for avoiding catastrophes, then option 1 is socially preferred
7
to option 2. If one instead thinks that it is more equitable if individuals share
a common fate, then option 2 is socially preferred to option 1. However,
if society expresses no concern for common fate considerations, then only
the expected number of fatalities should matter in this example, with the
consequence that options 1 and 2 are socially indifferent.3
In the preceding examples, nobody has to face the risk of dying alone. In
Example 1, anyone who dies shares this fate with all of the other residents of
the same city. In Example 2, everyone shares the same fate; the passengers
either all live or they all die. Humans are social beings and we do care if
our destinies are shared with others. It is the rare individual who prefers
to die alone. In the following example, the risk profiles for individuals and
for fatalities are identical in the two options, but some individuals face the
prospect of death alone, and this is a matter of social concern.
Example 3. As in the preceding example, a boat with one lifeboat is sinking.
The set of passengers on this boat is N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The lifeboat has
one seat in front, two seats in the middle, and one seat in the rear. Only
individuals 4 and 5 are small enough to fit in the middle seats. If four people
are put in the boat, it will sink for sure if person 1 is one of them because
he weighs so much. If the other four people are put in the lifeboat, with
probability 1
8
it will break in two because of the excessive weight. If it does
break, with equal probability it will do so either just in front of or just behind
the middle seats, in which case the part with three people will sink and the
other part will float to safety. If there are three people including person 1
in the boat, it sinks with probability 1
4
. Only individuals 1, 2, and 3 know
how to swim. If person 1 has to swim to shore, he has a probability of
drowning of 1
4
. Individuals 2 and 3 are weaker swimmers, so each of them
has a probability equal to 1
8
of drowning if they swim. The skipper regards
the following as his only two viable options:
Option 1. Let person 1 swim and put the other four people in the boat.
Option 2. Let individuals 2 and 3 swim and put the other three people in
the boat.
3Keeney (1980a) has argued that society should exhibit a preference for catastrophe
avoidance. Fishburn (1984) and Fishburn and Straffin (1989) have formulated axioms for
social risk evaluation that distinguish between the three attitutes towards common fates
described above. Bommier and Zuber (2008) have recently argued that a preference for
catastrophe avoidance can provide an ethical foundation for social discounting.
8
Let rj be the social risk distribution corresponding to option j, j = 1, 2.
For subgroups S for which the probability of dying is positive in at least one
of the two options, the values of rj(S) are shown in the following table.
∅ {1} {2} {3} {1, 4, 5} {2, 4, 5} {3, 4, 5}
r1 1
2
1
4
0 0 0 1
8
1
8
r2 1
2
0 1
8
1
8
1
4
0 0
As shown in the following table, the risk profiles for these individuals are
identical in the two options.
1 2 3 4 5
αr1
1
4
1
8
1
8
1
4
1
4
αr2
1
4
1
8
1
8
1
4
1
4
In addition, as shown in the following table, the risk profiles for fatalities
are also the same in the two options.
0 1 2 3 4 5
βr1
1
2
1
4
0 1
4
0 0
βr2
1
2
1
4
0 1
4
0 0
If the risk profiles for individuals and for the number of fatalities were all
that mattered for the evaluation of social risk equity, then the two options
would be regarded as being socially indifferent. However, with r1, individual
1 has a probability 1
4
of dying alone and a probability 0 of dying with other
people, whereas individuals 2 and 3 have a probability 0 of dying alone and
a probability 1
8
of dying with two other individuals. With r2, individual 1
has a probability 0 of dying alone and a probability 1
4
of dying with two
other individuals, whereas individuals 2 and 3 have a probability 1
8
of dying
alone and a probability 0 of dying with other people. With both r1 and r2,
individuals 4 and 5 each have a probability of 1
4
of dying with two other indi-
viduals and a probability 0 of dying alone. One may argue that individuals
feel better when they share their destiny with a larger number of people, or
at least when they do not face the risk of death alone. If the social evaluation
of risk equity takes these concerns into account and if, for example, society
expresses a strong aversion to individuals facing the risk of dying alone, then
it is reasonable to suppose that r1 is socially preferred to r2 because there
is the same probability that someone dies alone in both options, but more
people face this risk in the second option.
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4. Shared destinies
In this section, we propose a restriction on the social risk evaluation  that,
when combined with Axioms 1 and 2, permits one to take account of the
number of people who share one’s fate, not just the risk profiles for individuals
and the risk profiles for fatalities.
4.1. Simply Related Social Risk Distributions
Our new condition is a weakened version of an axiom introduced by Fishburn
and Straffin (1989). Fishburn and Straffin were interested in identifying
restrictions on the social risk evaluation that are necessary and sufficient for
the overall evaluation to only depend on the risk profiles for individuals and
the risk profiles for fatalities. To state Fishburn and Staffin’s axiom, we first
need to introduce the concept of simply related social risk distributions.
Definition 1. Two social risk distributions p, q ∈ P are simply related if either
(i) p = q or (ii) p 6= q and there exist A,B,C,D ⊆ N and δ > 0 such that
A 6= ∅, A ∩ B = ∅, |A| = |B|, (C ∪D) ∩ (A ∪ B) = ∅, C ∪D 6= ∅, and p
and q are identical except that:
1. q(A ∪ C) = p(A ∪ C)− δ
2. q(B ∪ C) = p(B ∪ C) + δ
3. q(A ∪D) = p(A ∪D) + δ
4. q(B ∪D) = p(B ∪D)− δ .
Consider the case in which the social risk distributions p and q are not
identical. The groups A and B in this definition are disjoint, but contain the
same number of individuals. These two groups are also disjoint from both C
and D. The distributions p and q are identical except for how likely groups
A and B are to perish with either C or D. In the case of A, in moving
from p to q, some probability is shifted from dying with the members of C
to dying with the members of D. The reverse shift of the same amount of
probability applies to B. Thus, p and q only differ in the relative likelihood
that members of A and B die with members of C and D. It is easily checked
that if p and q are simply related, then (αp, βp) = (αq, βq). That is, the risk
profiles for individuals and the risk profiles for fatalities associated with p
and q are identical.
For homogeneous societies, Fishburn and Straffin (1989) regard two social
risk distributions as being socially indifferent if they are simply related.
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Axiom 3. For all p, q ∈ P , p ∼ q if p and q are simply related.
Fishburn and Straffin (1989, Theorem 1) have established the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. Assume that Axioms 1 and 2 hold. Then Axiom 3 holds if and
only if for all p, q ∈ P,
(αp, βp) = (αq, βq)⇒ p ∼ q.
Thus, given Axioms 1, 2, and 3, the only information that is needed
to determine how to socially rank p and q in terms of social risk equity
are the corresponding risk profiles for individuals and for fatalities. For the
reasons discussed earlier, Fishburn and Straffin do not advocate the adoption
of Axiom 3 in heterogeneous societies. However, they suggest that if the
composition of the set of individuals who die is not of social concern, then
this axiom is an appealing restriction on the social risk evaluation . But
even if one believes that individuals should be treated symmetrically, Axiom
3 is incompatible with taking account of how many people an individual
shares his fate with provided that  is transitive. To see why this is the
case, we consider an expanded version of Example 3.
Example 4. As in Example 3, N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. There are now three social
risk distributions under consideration, r1, r2, and r3. The values of rj(S)
are shown in the following table for all the subgroups S for which there is a
positive probability that this subgroup perishes.
∅ {1} {2} {3} {1, 4, 5} {2, 4, 5} {3, 4, 5}
r1 1
2
1
4
0 0 0 1
8
1
8
r2 1
2
0 1
8
1
8
1
4
0 0
r3 1
2
1
8
0 1
8
1
8
1
8
0
Note that r1 and r2 are the social risk distributions considered in Example
3. The distributions r1 and r3 are simply related, with A = {1}, B = {3},
C = ∅, D = {4, 5}, and δ = 1
8
. Similarly, r3 and r2 are simply related,
with A = {1}, B = {2}, C = ∅, D = {4, 5} and δ = 1
8
. Therefore, Axiom
3 together with the transitivity of  imply that r1 ∼ r2. However, in our
discussion of Example 3 we have argued that this preference is unacceptable
if the number of people one dies with is a matter of social concern. Because
the risk profiles for individuals and for fatalities are identical in all three
options, the Fishburn–Straffin approach requires that they be regarded as
being socially indifferent.
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4.2. Strongly Related Social Risk Distributions
In the definition of simply related social risk distributions, the groups A and
B are of the same size, but C and D may not be. As a consequence, the
redistribution of risk need not be among groups of the same size. It is for
this reason that the social risk evaluation in the Fishburn–Straffin approach
is insensitive to the number of individuals one dies with. To overcome this
problem, we propose to weaken Axiom 3 so that it only applies to simply
related social risk distributions for which the redistribution of risk is made
between same-sized groups. Such distributions are called strongly related.
Definition 2. Two social risk distributions p, q ∈ P are strongly related if
either (i) p = q or (ii) p 6= q and there exist A,B,C,D ⊆ N and δ > 0 such
that A 6= ∅, A ∩ B = ∅, |A| = |B|, |C| = |D|, (C ∪ D) ∩ (A ∪ B) = ∅,
C ∪D 6= ∅, and p and q are identical except that:
1. q(A ∪ C) = p(A ∪ C)− δ
2. q(B ∪ C) = p(B ∪ C) + δ
3. q(A ∪D) = p(A ∪D) + δ
4. q(B ∪D) = p(B ∪D)− δ .
Clearly, if p and q are strongly related, then they are also simply related.
For all p, q ∈ P , if p and q are strongly related, we say that q is obtained from
p by the strongly related shift q−p. We require two social risk distributions to
be socially indifferent if they are strongly related. Thus, it is not a matter of
social concern with whom an individual dies with, but it is of social concern
how many individuals he shares this fate with.
Axiom 4. For all p, q ∈ P , p ∼ q if p and q are strongly related.
To state our analogue of Theorem 1, we first need to introduce some
additional notation. For all p ∈ P , let Mp be the n× n matrix whose entry
in the kth row and ith column is Mp(ki) =
∑
S∈S(k,i) p(S). That is, Mp(ki) is
the probability that person i dies with exactly k− 1 other individuals. Note
that αp(i) =
∑n
k=1Mp(ki) for all i ∈ N , βp(k) = 1k
∑n
i=1Mp(ki) for all k ∈ N ,
and βp(0) = 1−∑nk=1 βp(k). Thus, knowledge of Mp is sufficient to compute
both αp and βp.
Theorem 2. Assume that Axioms 1 and 2 hold. Then Axiom 4 holds if and
only if for all p, q ∈ P,
Mp = Mq ⇒ p ∼ q. (1)
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Proof. (a) Consider any i ∈ N . There is some group S containing i for which
the probability of dying differs in p and q only if i ∈ {A,B,C,D}. For such
i, because |A| = |B|, |C| = |D|, and A ∪ B is disjoint from C ∪D, in going
from p to q any loss of (resp. gain in) probability for some group that i is a
member of is exactly compensated for by a gain in (resp. loss of) probability
for some other group of the same size that also contains i. Hence, Mp = Mq.
Thus, by (1), p ∼ q.
(b) We now show that Axioms 1, 2, and 4 are sufficient for (1). For all
p ∈ P and all k ∈ N∗ such that ∑S∈T (k) p(S) 6= 0, let p˜k ∈ P be defined by
setting
p˜k(S) =

p(S)∑
T∈T (k) p(T )
if S ∈ T (k)
0 if S 6∈ T (k).
If
∑
S∈T (k) p(S) = 0, let p˜k be defined by setting
p˜k(S) =
{
1 if S = ∅
0 if S 6= ∅.
Note that for all p ∈ P and all (k, i) ∈ N ×N ,
Mp(ki) =
(∑
S3i
p˜k(S)
) ∑
T∈T (k)
p(T )
 = αp˜k(i)βp(k)
and
βp˜k(k) = 1.
Furthermore, for all p ∈ P ,
p =
n∑
k=0
p˜kβp(k). (2)
Now assume that p, q ∈ P are such that Mp = Mq and, hence, that
αp = αq and βp = βq. Assume, furthermore, that p(S) and q(S) are rational
for all S. Then, for all (k, i) ∈ N×N , αp˜k(i) = αq˜k(i). Thus, by the argument
in the proof of Lemma 1 in Fishburn and Straffin (1989), for all k ∈ N , there
exists a sequence rk1 , r
k
2 , . . . , r
k
t(k) of probability distributions such that p˜
k is
simply related to rk1 , r
k
τ is simply related to r
k
τ+1 for all τ ∈ {1, . . . , t(k)− 1},
and rkt(k) is simply related to q˜
k.4 Because p˜k(S) = 0 for all S 6∈ T (k)\{∅}
4Note that p˜ and q˜ have zero probability for all nonempty sets of size different from k.
Thus, the Claim on p. 236 in Fishburn and Straffin (1989) can only hold with |G| = k and
|H| = k. This guarantees that the sets C and D in their proof have the same cardinality.
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and q˜k(S) = 0 for all S 6∈ T (k)\{∅}, all of these distributions are actually
strongly related. Let skτ = r
k
τ+1 − rkτ if τ ∈ {1, . . . , t(k) − 1}, sk0 = rk1 − p˜k,
and skt(k) = q˜
k − rkt(k). We thus have, for all k ∈ N ,
q˜k = p˜k +
t(k)∑
τ=0
skτ . (3)
Equations (2) and (3) imply that
q =
n∑
k=0
q˜kβq(k)
=
n∑
k=0
p˜k + t(k)∑
τ=0
skτ
 βq(k)
=
n∑
k=0
p˜kβq(k) +
n∑
k=0
t(k)∑
τ=0
skτβq(k)
= p+
n∑
k=0
t(k)∑
τ=0
skτβq(k).
Thus, q is obtained by adding to p a sequence of strongly related shifts.
Axiom 4 therefore implies that p ∼ q.
By using the continuity of  (Axiom 2), this conclusion also holds if any
p(S) or q(S) is irrational. For the details of this extension argument, see
Fishburn and Straffin (1989).
In order to illustrate the added flexibility provided by our weakening of
Axiom 3, we construct a parametric family of social risk evaluation functions
that are then used to evaluate the options in Example 4. Suppose that each
individual i ∈ N has a utility function Ui : P → R for which for all p ∈ P ,
Ui(p) = −f
(∑
S3i
1
|S|ρp(S)
)
,
where f is increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously differentiable,
f(0) = 0, and ρ ∈ R. If ρ = 0, then individual i does not care about how
many people with whom he dies. If i ∈ S, S ⊂ S ′, and p(S) = p(S ′), then
i prefers to die in the larger group if and only if ρ > 0. These observations
suggest that ρ is likely to be positive.
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Further suppose that the social risk evaluation  is represented by the
evaluation function W : P → R given by
W (p) =
n∑
i=1
f(Ui(p)) + V
1(αp) + V
2(βp)
for all p ∈ P , where V 1 : [0, 1]n → R is a measure of social risk equity for
distributions of risk for individuals and V 2 : [0, 1]n+1 → R is a measure of
social risk attitudes towards the number of fatalities.
The values of Ui for the risk distributions r
1, r2, and r3 in Example 4 are
presented in the following table.
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5
r1 −f(1
4
) −f(1
8
1
3ρ
) −f(1
8
1
3ρ
) −f(1
4
1
3ρ
) −f(1
4
1
3ρ
)
r2 −f(1
4
1
3ρ
) −f(1
8
) −f(1
8
) −f(1
4
1
3ρ
) −f(1
4
1
3ρ
)
r3 −f(1
8
1
3ρ
+ 1
8
) −f(1
8
1
3ρ
) −f(1
8
) −f(1
4
1
3ρ
) −f(1
4
1
3ρ
)
Define the function F : P → R by setting
F (p) =
3∑
i=1
f(Ui(p))
for all p ∈ P . Because Ui(r1) = Ui(r2) = Ui(r3) for i ∈ {4, 5}, αr1 = αr2 =
αr3 , and βr1 = βr2 = βr3 , the three risk distributions being considered are
socially ranked by the values of F . Letting θ = 1
3ρ
, these values are given by
F (r1) = −f
(
1
4
)
− 2f
(
θ
8
)
,
F (r2) = −f
(
θ
4
)
− 2f
(
1
8
)
,
and
F (r3) = −f
(
1
8
)
− f
(
θ
8
)
− f
(
θ
8
+
1
8
)
.
Note that θ = 1 when ρ = 0 and that θ is decreasing with respect to ρ.
The social ranking of r1 and r2 can be determined from the sign of
∆12(θ) = F (r
1)− F (r2) = f
(
θ
4
)
+ 2f
(
1
8
)
− f
(
1
4
)
− 2f
(
θ
8
)
.
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Clearly, ∆12(1) = 0. Differentiating ∆12(θ), we obtain
d∆12(θ)
dθ
= −1
4
f ′
(
θ
8
)
+
1
4
f ′
(
θ
4
)
< 0,
where the inequality follows from our assumption that f ′′ < 0. Therefore, ∆12
is increasing with respect to ρ. We have thus shown that F (r1) > F (r2) ⇔
ρ > 0; i.e., r1  r2 ⇔ ρ > 0. In our discussion of Example 3, we suggested
that it is reasonable to suppose that r1 is socially preferred to r2 if society
expresses a concern for shared destinies, which requires ρ to be positive if
the social risk evaluation  is represented by the function W . However, in
our discussion of Example 4, we have shown that if  satisfies Fishburn and
Straffin’s three axioms, then r1 must be socially indifferent to r2, which is
only compatible with ρ = 0.5
There are substantial informational advantages associated with construct-
ing an index of social risk equity if two social risk distributions are judged to
be socially indifferent whenever their associated distributions of risk of death
for individuals and for the number of fatalities are the same. As noted by
Fishburn and Straffin (1989), to characterize a social risk distribution p ∈ P ,
2n − 1 quantities are needed, whereas only 2n − 1 quantities are needed to
compute αp and βp. The computational complexity of Mp lies between these
two extremes. For any p ∈ P , the entries in the last row of the matrix
Mp are identical because everybody has the same probability of dying with
n− 1 other people. Thus, n(n− 1) + 1 quantities are needed to compute Mp.
While not as informationally parsimonious as a social risk evaluation that
only depends on the distributions of risks for individuals and for fatalities,
our approach is less demanding than a social risk evaluation based on all of
the information in a social risk distribution because the computation of p is
exponential in n, whereas the computation of Mp is only polynomial in n.
While such practical considerations are important, they should not be deci-
sive if important aspects of social risk equity are neglected, such as a concern
for shared destinies. For this reason, we believe that the ability to take ac-
5Similar arguments may be used to show that r1  r3 ⇔ ρ > 0 and that the social
ranking of r2 and r3 depends on both the choice of f and ρ. If instead of requiring f to
be strictly concave, we had set f equal to the identity function, then for every value of ρ,
the three risk distributions we are considering are socially indifferent. As a consequence,
even though every individual expresses a concern for shared destinies when ρ 6= 0, society
does not.
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count of this concern in our approach to social risk evaluation outweighs the
informational advantages of the approach of Fishburn and Straffin.
5. Concluding remarks
We have shown that the social risk evaluation only depends on the proba-
bilities that an individual dies with k other individuals for k = 0, . . . , n − 1
if our three axioms are satisfied. Thus, in contrast to Fishburn and Straffin
(1989), the social risk evaluation is able to exhibit a concern for the shared
destinies of the members of society. Our axioms are consistent with different
views on how shared destinies matter. It is reasonable to believe that it is
socially (and individually) preferable to perish with some other individuals
rather than to perish alone, but only if the number of other individuals who
die is not substantial. However, our appraoch does not commit us to this
belief.
By considering additional axioms, further structure can be imposed on
the social risk evaluation. A major focus of the analysis of Fishburn and
Straffin (1989) is the identification of maximally consistent sets of axioms
that include Axioms 1, 2, and 3. A natural extension of our analysis would
be to undertake a similar excercise for Axioms 1, 2, and 4.
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